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the compelled execution of consent forms 
authorizing foreign banks to disclose 
records of the defendant's accounts did not 
infringe upon the fifth amendment privi-
lege, because neither the consent form nor 
its execution communicated any factual 
assertion. The Court explained that "to be 
testimonial, an accused's communication 
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate 
an actual assertion or disclose information 
[because] [o]nly then is a person compelled 
to be a 'witness' against himself." fd. 
Similarly, in United States v. Campos· 
Serrano, 430 F .2d 173 (7th Cir. 1970), the 
court found a violation of the fifth amend-
ment priv~lege when a defendant was 
coerced into producing a forged alien regis-
tration card. The court ruled that, in prcr 
ducing the card, the defendant implicitly 
admitted the existence, location and con-
trol over the card and so was "compelled 
to produce the crime itself." fd. at 176. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rec-
ognized, in the case sub judice, that Bouk-
night had a reasonable apprehension of 
prosecution if, in accordance with the 
court's order, she produced Maurice or 
revealed his whereabouts, and the informa-
tion disclosed that the child had suffered 
further abuse or was even dead. If a crime 
has been committed upon Maurice's per-
son, Bouknight, by disclosing the deman-
ded information, would be incriminating 
herself. The court ruled that such commu-
nication, whether in the form of the com-
pelled act of production or verbal 
disclosure, is implicitly a testimonial com-
munication and so falls within the contem-
plation of the fifth amendment privilege. 
The court also addressed the State's argu-
ment that Bouknight waived her fifth 
amendment privileges when she told the 
court that Maurice was in Texas. The 
court noted that Bouknight was not a 
witness when she imparted this informa-
tion, nor was she under oath, and the inac-
curate information she revealed was not 
directly incriminating. Thus, the court 
ruled that Bouknight's fifth amendment 
privilege remained intact. 
The State's alternative contention that 
the public right to protect its children, as 
manifested by the Juvenile Causes Act, 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 
3-801-3-836 (1984), outweighs Bouk-
night's fifth amendment privilege was 
rejected by the court. Although the court 
recognized the validity of the State's argu-
ment that applying the constraints of the 
fifth amendment in cases of child abuse 
would afford a parent "carte blanche to 
conceal any negative information about 
the child's status and thereby strip the 
Juvenile Court of its ability to protect 
children suspected of being abused," it 
held that case law does not favor statutory 
requirements over constitutional protec-
tion when there is a strong possibility of 
incrimination. Maurice M. at 408, 550 A.2d 
at 1143. Under the circumstances of this 
case, where the risk to Bouknight of prose-
cution is so substantial, the court could not 
totally expunge Bouknight's fifth amend-
ment rights. Thus, the court vacated the 
civil contempt order. 
In a strong dissent, Judge McAuliffe 
stated that by producing Maurice, Bouk-
night would implicitly admit that 1) the 
child is Maurice, and that 2) she has suffi-
cient control and dominion over the child 
to produce him. Although these facts 
might be used against Bouknight in a 
criminal prosecution, Judge McAuliffe 
argued that communications which can be 
classified as foregone conclusions or as self-
evident information are of minimal testi-
monial significance, and consequently 
should not be afforded fifth amendment 
protection. Since Maurice could be identi-
fied solely by the scope of his injuries, and 
since evidence of who had control and 
dominion over the child furnishes no evi-
dence of who had control over him at the 
time of his injuries, no significant evidence 
which merits fifth amendment protection 
can be gleaned from the production of 
Maurice. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
vacated a civil contempt order of the 
Juvenile Court by which a mother 
suspected of child abuse was directed to 
produce the juvenile before the court or 
disclose his whereabouts. Under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the court decided 
that the mother's act of producing the 
child had testimonial implications that 
could incriminate her in the event of a 
criminal prosecution. Thus, the mother's 
claim of privilege under the fifth amend-
ment was upheld. 
- Mary fo Murphy 
Richmond v. Croson Co.: SUPREME 
COURT INVALIDATES SET-ASIDE 
PLAN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE 
JOBS FOR MINORITIES 
The United States Supreme Court struck 
down a city ordinance that channeled 30% 
of public funds to minority-owned con-
struction companies because it violated the 
fourteenth amendment's equal protection 
clause. Richmond v. Croson Co. 57 
U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989). For 
the first time, a majority of the Court has 
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard for 
equal protection review of race-conscious 
legislation. 
The Richmond City Council adopted 
the Minority Business Utilization Plan 
("the Plan"), a minority set-aside program 
that required prime contractors of city 
construction projects to subcontract at 
least 30% of the dollar amount of the con-
tract to Minority Business Enterprises 
(MBEs). The Plan was modeled after the 
congressional program in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which was 
held constitutional. The Plan's propon.ents 
claimed, inter alia, that although Rich-
mond's general population was 50% black, 
only .67% of the city's prime construction 
contracts had been awarded to MBEs in a 
five-year period. Thus, the plan was 
declared "remedial." 
A facial challenge to the ordinance was 
brought in 1983 by J .A. Croson Co. 
("Croson"), a white-owned plumbing 
company which lost a $126,000 contract to 
provide plumbing fixtures for the city jail. 
Croson, the sole bidder on the project, 
tried to comply with the set-aside require-
ment but was unable to obtain any MBEs 
to subcontract for the job. Croson sought 
waiver of the set-aside requirement, indi-
cating that the MBEs contacted were either 
unqualified, unresponsive, or unable to 
quote a bid. fd at 4436. Richmond denied 
Croson's request and decided to rebid the 
project. fd. 
Because the Plan was patterned after the 
program in Fullilove, both the federal dis-
trict court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit relied on the Fullilove 
precedent and upheld the Plan. Croson 
sought certiorari; the Supreme Court 
vacated the court of appeal's decision and 
remanded the case in light of Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
(1986). On remand, the court of appeals 
struck down the Plan because it violated 
both prongs of strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause. 
In an opinion written by Justice O'Con-
nor, the Court held that strict scrutiny was 
the proper standard of review, and that the 
Plan failed both prongs of that test: (1) that 
the state had a compelling interest; and (2) 
that its Plan was narrowly tailored to a-
chieve that interest. As to the first prong of 
the test, the Court held that the city failed 
to "demonstrate a compelling interest in 
apportioning public contracting oppor-
tunities on the basis of race" because it 
adduced no evidence of "any identified dis-
crimination in the Richmond construction 
industry." Croson at 4142. Although Rich-
mond argued that it was attempting to 
remedy various forms of past discrimina-
tion, it did not offer specific acts of dis-
crimination, but rather it relied on general 
assertions of past discrimination coupled 
with the similar inference drawn from 
various statistical disparities. Richmond 
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relied on much of the same evidence found 
in Fullilow, congressional investigations of 
nationwide discrimination in the industry, 
as well as its own evidence of discrimina-
tion in the local industry. The Court, 
however, dismissed the congressional evi-
dence as irrelevant, and deemed the local 
evidence nonspecific and of limited pro-
bative value in establishing identified dis--
cnmmation which would warrant 
remedial action. Such "a generalized asser-
tion that there has been past discrimina-
tion in an entire industry provides no 
guidance for a legislative body to deter-
mine the precise scope of the injury it 
seeks to remedy," and is too amorphous to 
support an unyielding racial quota. Id. at 
4140. The Court conceded that "[w]hile 
there is no doubt that the sorry history 
of. .. discrimination in this country con-
tributed to a lack of opportunities for 
black entrepreneurs, this observation, 
standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial 
quota in the awarding of public contracts 
in Richmond, Virginia." Id. 
Similarly, the statistical disparity 
between the number of prime contracts 
awarded to minority firms and the minori-
ty population of Richmond was deemed to 
be misplaced, because the statistic did not 
identify any specific discrimination. The 
Court found it factually significant that 
the city did not even "know how many 
MBEs in the relevant market were quali-
fied to undertake prime or subcontracting 
work in public construction projects." Id. 
at 4141. 
The mere fact that black member-
ship in these trade organizations is 
low, standing alone, cannot establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination ... If 
the statistical disparity between eligi-
ble MBEs and MBE membership were 
great enough, an inference of discrimi-
natory exclusion could arise. In such a 
case, the city would have a compelling 
interest in preventing its tax dollars 
from assisting these organizations in 
maintaining a racially segregated con-
struction market. 
Id. Thus, Richmond had to identify speci-
fic discrimination before it enacted a race-
conscious remedy. Although Congress had 
not identified specific discrimination in 
FullilO'lle, that program was valid because 
section five of the fourteenth amendment 
broadened Congress' powers to deal with 
such discrimination. Id. at 4142. States, 
however, were held to a stricter standard 
of identifying a specifu: discrimination 
before remedial measures could be taken. 
Id. Because Richmond did not identify a 
specific act of past discrimination, it failed 
to establish a compelling interest for its 
Plan. 
The Plan failed the second prong of the 
test because it was not narrowly tailored to 
remedy the effects of specific past discrimi-
nation: "The gross overinclusiveness of 
[the Plan] strongly impugns the city's 
claim of residential motivation." Id. Since 
the Plan was "not linked to identified dis--
crimination in any way," the Court could 
not assess whether it was "narrowly tai-
lored to remedy prior discrimination." Id. 
The Court noted an absence of any race-
neutral means to increase minority partici-
pation in city contracting. It suggested that 
a "race-neutral program of city financing 
for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to 
greater minority participation." Id. The 
Court also deemed it significant that there 
was an absence of any evidence that Rich-
mond had considered any alternatives to a 
race-based quota. 
Moreover, the Court held that the 30% 
quota was not "narrowly tailored to any 
goal, except outright racial balancing." Id. 
It reasoned that "[s]ince the city must 
already consider bids on a case-by-case 
basis, it is difficult to see the need for a 
rigid numerical quota." Id. at 4143. Fur-
thermore, the Plan was distinguished from 
the scheme in Fullilove because that pro-
gram provided waiver of the set-aside pro-
visions where an MBE's higher price was 
not attributable to the effects of past dis--
crimination. The Croson court viewed the 
quota system as an attempt by Richmond 
to avoid the "bureaucratic effort necessary 
to tailor remedial relief to those who truly 
have suffered the effects of prior discrimi-
nation [and] cannot justify a rigid line 
drawn on the basis of a suspect classifica-
tion." Id. Finally, the Plan was overbroad 
because it included such racial groups as 
Indians, Orientals and Eskimos, against 
whom there was no evidence of discrimi-
nation. Consequently, the Plan's 30% 
quota could not realistically be tied to any 
injury suffered by anyone and was 
overinclusive. 
A plurality of the Court distinguished 
Croson from FullilO'lle because Congress 
passed the legislation in FullilO'lle. Citing 
FulliiO'lle, the Court held that section five 
of the fourteenth amendment gave Con-
gress unique and broad remedial powers. 
Id. at 4139. Congress did not have to dem-
onstrate any specific prior discrimination-
as required by states-in order to pass such 
legislation. The Court expounded that 
Congress enforces the fourteenth amend-
ment and it has "the power to define situa-
tions which Congress determines threaten 
principles of equality and to adopt 
rules ... to deal with those situations." Id. 
at 4138. Claiming that the Civil War 
amendments "worked a dramatic change 
in the balance between congressional and 
state power over matters of race," the 
Court emphasized that the fourteenth 
amendment was actually intended to limit 
the powers of states and enlarge the 
powers of Congress. "That Congress may 
identify and redress the effects of society-
wide discrimination does not mean 
that ... the States ... are free to decide that 
such remedies are appropriate." Id. 
The Court conceded that the state had 
the "authority to eradicate the effects of 
private discrimination within its own legis--
lative jurisdiction," but that this right 
must be "exercised within the constraints 
of §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment," 
which required Richmond to identify spe-
cific discrimination before it could enact 
remedial relief. Id. at 4138. The Court 
noted that the rights created by section 
one of the fourteenth amendment were 
guaranteed to the individual and the rights 
established are personal rights. Id. at 4138-
39 (citing Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,22 
(1948)). The Richmond plan breached 
those "personal rights" because it denied 
"certain citizens the opportunity to com-
pete for a fIXed percentage of public con-
tracts, based solely upon their race." Id. at 
4139. Strict scrutiny was, therefore, neces--
sary to determine which classifications 
were "benign" or "remedial," or which 
classifications were motivated by illegiti-
mate prejudices of race. "The test also 
ensures that the means chosen "fit" the 
compelling goal so closely that there is lit-
tle or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial preju-
dice or stereotype." Id. 
Thus, if Richmond had evidence that 
non-minority contractors were discrimi-
nating against minority businesses, it could 
eradicate that discrimination. Even if Rich-
mond could demonstrate a significant sta-
tistical disparity between the "number of 
qualified MBEs and the number of MBEs 
actually hired by the locality's prime con-
tractors, an inference of discriminatory 
exclusion could arise." Id. at 4143. In such 
circumstances, the "city could dismantle 
the closed business system by taking 
appropriate measures against those who 
discriminate on the basis of race." Id. "In 
the extreme case, some form of narrowly 
tailored racial preference might be neces--
sary to break down patterns of deliberate 
exclusion." Id. 
In a cogent dissent, Justice Marshall 
claimed the Court had imposed a "daunt-
ing standard" that would discourage states 
from "contemplating the use of race-
conscious measures to eradicate the pres--
ent effects of past discrimination." Id. at 
4156. The result of which "marks a deli-
berate and giant step backward in this 
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence." 
Id. at 4149. Justice Marshall accused the 
Court of trivializing Richmond's evidence 
by examining it piecemeal, and not in the 
context of the national pattern of discrimi-
nation revealed by Congress in Ful/ilO'lle. 
Unable to distinguish Croson from Fulli· 
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love, Justice Marshall asserted a less strin-
gent test for race-based legislation: (1) that 
remedial goals must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives; (2) and must be 
substantially related to the attainment of 
those goals. Id. at 4150. Justice Marshall 
discerned two of Richmond's remedial 
goals: to eradicate the effects of past racial 
discrimination, and to refrain from perpet-
uating the effects of that discrimination. 
Id. at 4150-51. This discrimination was 
based on a "varied body of evidence." Id. 
at 4152. A national pattern of discrimina-
tion had been set, from which Richmond 
did not deviate. Set in this context, Justice 
Marshall argued "Richmond's reliance on 
localized, industry-specific findings is a far 
cry from the reliance on generalized 
'societal discrimination' which the majori-
ty decries as a basis for remedial action." 
Id. He accused the majority of disinge-
nuinely "disaggregating Richmond's local 
evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and there-
by conclude that no single piece of evi-
dence ... standing alone ... suffices to prove 
past discrimination." Id. at 4153. Justice 
Marshall concluded that the fourteenth 
amendment did not impose "such onerous 
[evidentiary] obligations upon states ... 
once the reality of past discrimination is 
apparent." Id. at 4154. 
Secondly, the Plan was valid because "it 
is substantially related to the interests it 
seeks to serve in remedying past discrimi-
nation .... " Id. at 4145. He pointed out 
that the majority overlooked the fact that 
Richmond had a previous antidiscrimina-
tion statute and race-neutral legislation 
that had virtually no effect on the eradica-
tion of the past discrimination. As to the 
majority's claim that the 30% target could 
not be narrowly tailored to any state goal, 
he proclaimed that the Court ignored the 
fact that the 30% figure was patterned 
directly on the Fullilove precedent. 
Justice Marshall concluded by denounc-
ing the majority's adoption of the strict 
scrutiny standard for review of race-
conscious remedial measures. He argued 
that remedial classifications warranted a 
different standard of review from "brute 
and repugnant state-sponsored racism" 
and that the Court's holding indicated 
"that it regards racism as a phenomenon of 
the past." Id. at 4155. 
The Court has adopted the rigid stand-
ard of strict scrutiny as the standard of 
review for benign and remedial discrimina-
tion measures. The Court's holding 
expressed that laws favoring blacks over 
whites must be judged by the same consti-
tutional standard as laws favoring whites 
over blacks. The result could be the undo-
ing of many affirmative action programs 
nationwide, and will serve to discourage 
the enactment of future affirmative action 
legislation. 
- Peter T. McDowell 
McAvoy v. State: A SUSPECT 
STOPPED FOR DRIVING WHILE 
INTOXICATED IS NOT ENTIUED 
TO MIRANDA ADVICE PRIOR TO 
A FIELD OR CHEMICAL SOBRIETY 
TEST. 
A suspect who has been detained on sus-
picion of driving while intoxicated is not 
entitled to Miranda advice before being 
asked to perform field or chemical sobrie-
ty tests according to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 
509,551 A.2d 875 (1989). In so doing, the 
court of appeals upheld the decisions of 
both the lower court and the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland. 
Joseph McAvoy was stopped by police 
for failing to obey a sign which prohibited 
right turns on a red light. After McAvoy 
was stopped, the officer and McAvoy 
engaged in a discussion over whether such 
a sign existed. To resolve the dispute, both 
men returned to the intersection where the 
alleged infraction occurred. While there, 
they confirmed the existence of the sign in 
question, and at that point the officer then 
recognized signs of intoxication on 
McAvoy. As a result, the officer requested 
McAvoy to perform various field sobriety 
tests. McAvoy failed the tests and was 
arrested for driving while intoxicated. 
Shortly after the arrest, McAvoy was 
read a standard form DR-15, Advice of 
Rights to a Chemical Test. This form 
advised him of rights and obligations 
under Maryland's implied consent law 
(Maryland Transp. Code Ann. § 16-205.1), 
but did not advise him of his right to coun-
sel. McAvoy elected to take a breathalyzer 
test, which determined that he had .20 per-
cent by weight of alcohol in his blood. 
After the test, McAvoy was arrested for 
driving under the influence and advised of 
his Miranda rights. At trial McAvoy con-
tended that the evidence produced from 
these tests was obtained by custodial inter-
rogation and therefore not admissible 
without a prior Miranda warning. 
A custodial interrogation is defined in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way." Id. 
at 444. To counter the "inherently com-
pelling pressures" of custodial interroga-
tion, the Supreme Court in Miranda held 
that a suspect in custody must be advised 
of certain constitutional rights and may 
only then voluntarily waive them if he so 
chooses. Id. at 467. 
McAvoy argued, and the court rejected, 
that at the time of the field sobriety test he 
was in custody. Even though the officer 
invited McAvoy to return to the scene of 
the infraction, and even though he had 
subjectively decided to detain McAvoy 
when he detected his intoxication, the 
court held that neither element was 
enough to elicit a custodial interrogation 
under Miranda. 
In further support of its position that 
McAvoy was not in custody, the court of 
appeals examined Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420 (1984). The Supreme Court 
held that a temporary detention in connec-
tion with an ordinary traffic stop would 
not constitute custody in order to require 
Miranda advice. To remain temporary the 
stop must be brief, in a public place and 
the suspect must not be told that the stop 
would not be brief. Accordingly, a formal 
arrest would not result under Berkemer if 
"[a] single police officer asked a respon-
dent a modest number of questions and 
requested him to perform a simple balanc-
ing test at a location visible to passing 
motorists." McAvoy, 314 Md. at 516, 551 
A.2d at 878 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
434). Therefore, since McAvoy was stop-
ped in a public place, never told that his 
detention would not be brief, and the stop 
was in fact brief, he was not in custody 
according to Berkemer and the court of 
appeals. Furtheql1ore, during the stop, the 
officer only asked McAvoy to perform 
some field tests and did not interrogate 
him in any manner. McAvoy, 314 Md. at 
517, 551 A.2d at 879. 
After completion of the field sobriety 
test, however, McAvoy was formally 
arrested, taken into custody and asked to 
submit to a breathalyzer test. Nonetheless, 
the court held that McAvoy was still not 
entitled to Miranda advice because "[t]he 
breath taken from [him] was physical evi-
dence and was not testimonial within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination." Id. at 518, 
551 A.2d at 879. This fifth amendment 
protection "bars the State only from com-
pelling 'communications' or 'testimony'. 
Since a blood [or breath] test was 'physical 
or real' evidence rather than testimoni-
al ... " it is not protected. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559. McAvoy there-
fore had no right to Miranda advice prior 
to the breathalyzer test. 
The court of appeals further dismissed 
the argument that the officer's simple 
request of McAvoy to take a chemical 
sobriety test constituted an interrogation 
within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 518, 
551 A.2d at 879. According to the identical 
holding in Neville, supra., the police 
inquiry "is highly regulated by state law, 
and is presented in virtually the same 
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